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Abstract 
In this paper, we examine the role that institutions may play in enabling banks to  write 
contracts whereby sovereign debt is not forgiven ex post. Our model provides a rationale for 
the emergence of a centralized forum for debt renegotiation, such as the London Club as well 
as for bank syndicates. These bank syndicates arise as part of a pre-commitment device rather 
than risk sharing. We propose a debt contract under which, only involuntary default is forgiven 
ex post. Our main findings are that under this contract, renegotiations take place only after 
involuntary default and debt forgiveness after voluntary (strategic) default is avoided. When 
voluntary default occurs, access to the credit market is denied only for a limited number of 
periods, rather than forever.  In  contrast to  a voluntary  default,  involuntary  default is 
renegotiated immediately. Limiting Punishment for Default on Sovereign Debt 
and the London Club 
One of the major problems in the literature on sovereign debt is the design of contracts 
limiting debt forgiveness. The difficulty stems from two sources: borrowers may not be able to 
credibly commit to repay the loan; similarly, lenders may not be able to credibly commit not to 
relend immediately to  borrowers who  default voluntarily.  I  This paper examines the debt 
contracts and bank syndication that emerge in the presence of institutions such as the London 
Club-a centralized forum for debt renegotiation. We find that such institutions may enable 
banks to write contracts whereby sovereign debt is not forgiven ex post. It  is well known that 
such contracts exist only under very restrictive conditions.2 Hence, given that the market for 
sovereign debt exists, it must be the case that market systems have developed which prevent 
lenders from being too lenient andlor borrowers from breaching the debt contract. 
Hum (1990, p.  1) defines a syndicate as follows: "A syndicate loan is a loan made by 
two  or  more  lending  institutions,  on  similar  terms  and  conditions,  using  common 
documentation and administered by a common agent.  II  Our objective is to explain why the 
common agent that emerges in the context of sovereign loans is the London Club. The London 
Club can be characterized as follows ..  In practice, the London Club does not have a formal 
structural organization, a permanent staff or a fixed location. Since Mexico's default in 1982, 
the coordination problem between many private-bank lenders has been solved in the following 
way: a consultative committee consisting of lending banks, normally from all the lending 
syndicates and representing all  bank lenders,  work out a debt restructuring plan;  after 
lAs is typical in the literature on sovereign debt, we distinguish between a voluntary (strategic) default and an 
involuntary default induced by liquidity problems. See, also, Eaton, Gersovitz and Stiglitz (1986). 
2Por example, Gromb (1994) and Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) show that renegotiation-free debt contracts will 
exist only under the condition that banks expect to make zero profits from their loans. Sovereign Debt  page 2 
acceptance by the lenders and the borrowers, this plan is implemented. These consultative 
committees are highly visible and are called the London Club. According to Kefu.lley (1993), 
this default-settling mechanism saves costs; furthennore, the London Club has a reputation of a 
tough bargainer.3 
Our work is motivated by the observation that from the second half of the eighties 
agencies such as the IMF, the Paris Club and the London Club have become increasingly 
important for handling country debt problems.4 We claim that, besides its efficiency in the 
handling of reschedulings,5 an institution such as the London Club may also serve as a device 
in helping banks to overcome the precornrnitrnent problem. When a debt problem is handled by 
a body like the London Club-a very visible and central device that manages many of the 
reschedulings of commercial bank loans-the borrower knows that lenders cannot afford to be 
lenient: leniency of the London Club and the consequent adjustment in borrower behavior 
could cause a general collapse of lending to countries by banks.6 Thus, using an institution 
such as the London Club allows banks to  credibly precomrnit not to  relend immediately 
3Kearney (1993, p.  66) reports that, "The London Club almost never reschedules interest obligations, and it 
charges current market interest rates on the principal payments rescheduled." 
4For a discussion of the important role that these institutions play in  debt renegotiations, see Kremmydas 
(1989) and Ebenroth (1989). 
5Note that,  in principle,  all  commercial banks  with  exposure to  the  debtor country  participate in debt 
reschedulings organized by the London Club. This number can be as large as 800 banks (in the case of the 
default by Mexico in 1982). With its experience and specialized procedures, the London Club is well suited to 
handle the complicated rescheduling process when such a large number of  creditors is involved. The involvement 
of so many creditors is the consequence of the equal treatment clauses implied in bank syndicate contracts. For 
an overview of equal treatment clauses see, for example, Ebenroth (1989, pp. 634-635). 
6It is well accepted, both by practitioners and academics, that if a financial institution relends easily to a 
voluntary defaulting borrower, other borrowers observing this, may change their policy from repaying to not 
repaying (see, for example, Chowdhry (1991». SovereiSll Debt  page 3 
following a voluntary default.  7 In the context of our model, banks precommit to using an 
institution such as the London Club ex ante by forming loan syndicates rather than lending 
independently. Consequently, following a voluntarily default, the syndicate finds it more 
efficient to penalize the borrower rather than to forgive it. Note that these bank syndicates arise 
as part of a pre-commitment device rather than for reasons of risk sharing. 
In the presence of an institution like the London Club, we propose a debt contract such 
that, depending on the type of default, debt mayor may not be forgiven ex post. Our main 
findings are that under this contract, debt is forgiven only after involuntary default and debt 
forgiveness after voluntary (strategic) default is avoided. Consistent with observed behavior, if 
voluntary default occurs access to the credit market is denied for only a limited number of 
periods rather than forever. The length of this punishment phase depends upon the growth 
prospects of the borrower: countries with high growth prospects reenter the credit market more 
quickly compared to countries with low growth prospects.8 In contrast to a voluntary default, 
involuntary default is forgiven immediately. 
In our model, the preceding results obtain because being denied credit is costly to the 
borrower. Hence, a credible threat of temporary denial of credit may be sufficient to prevent the 
borrower from defaulting voluntarily. Furthermore, we show that during this punishment 
phase no other lender has any interest in granting a loan because the borrower would rationally 
default on it; hence a borrower who defaults voluntarily is excluded from the borrowing market 
temporarily. However, no lender wishes to deny credit forever since such a policy would cut it 
off permanently from future profitable business. 
7  Given that the IMP and the Paris Club are concerned with debt provided by supra national and governmental 
agencies, in the handling of country debt by these institutions issues other than direct profitability of lending 
operations are likely to play an important role. Thus, our focus is on the London Club, which specializes in 
debt provided by private banks. See Kearney (1993) for a description of the differences between the Paris Club 
and the London Club. 
8In fact, for borrowers with very low growth prospects the credit market may close permanently. Sovereign Debt  page 4 
Our work is related to the literature that views institutions and the legal framework as 
tools that help create renegotiation-free contracts and is closest in spirit to Chowdhry (1991). 
Chowdhry also views syndication as part of a system that makes voluntary default costly to the 
borrower. However, whereas in Chowdhry the purpose of syndication is to limit the number 
of lenders to which a defaulting debtor has access, the present paper focuses on the role of 
syndication and the London Club as devices that make lenient treatment costly to lenders. Also, 
the predictions of our model about the functioning of the lending-borrowing market are very 
different from those in Chowdhry. In Chowdhry,  a lender never relends  to  a particular 
borrower after a default, while borrowing from  alternative lenders resumes immediately. 
However, once the supply of alternative lenders is exhausted, the borrower is denied credit 
permanently. As mentioned before, our contract predicts that after a default a lender generally 
relends to the defaulting borrower, but possibly only after some time has elapsed. During that 
time no other lender steps in so that the borrower is actually cut off from the credit market. 
As in Eaton, Gersovitz and Stiglitz (1986), who posit that penalties on lenient creditors 
are likely indirect, we aim at identifying how the institutional framework may create one such 
possible cost. In particular, the institutional feature studied in this paper enhances the reputation 
mechanism, thereby increasing the cost of being a lenient creditor. Other papers that consider 
the links between institutional features and the costs imposed on lenders include Chowdhry 
(1991), Eaton and Gersovitz (1981), Guttentag and Herring (1984), and Kaletsky (1985). 
Costs that the institutional setting may impose on borrowers have been studied by Bulow and 
Rogoff (1989), Giammarino and Nosal (1990), and Schwartz and Zurita (1992). 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows.  The model is described in Section 1. 
Section 2 contains our main results. Our conclusions are presented in Section 3. 
1.  The  Model 
In this section, we characterize the London Club in the context of our problem and the 
assumptions made to derive our results. Sovereign Debt  page 5 
Commensurate with reality, we define the London Club as a highly visible mechanism 
whereby a limited committee of banks involved in the bankruptcy coordinates the actions of 
lenders who wish to participate in coordinated behavior. As mentioned before, this coordinated 
behavior leads to cost savings once the number of banks in the syndicate is large enough. We 
also assume that once enough borrowers are involved, this committee becomes very visible; 
this visibility implies that the committee acts under the assumption that if it is lenient to a 
voluntarily defaulting borrower, in the future, borrowers will always default voluntarily. Hum 
(1990, p. 95) states that, "overlooking the default can never be an appropriate course of action 
for a prudent banker; a court would likely interpret such inactivity as being a permanent waiver 
of default." An example where the banks were clearly concerned about the precedent-setting 
effects of the acceptance of a lenient debt-settlement proposal is the case of debt renegotiation 
with Zaire in (1979); details can be found in Callaghy (1993). 
In our model, a syndicate has to solve the following three problems: (a) create a debt 
contract such that, if the syndicate precommits to  this contract, it is not in the borrower's 
interest to default voluntarily; (b) create a precommitment to the debt contract by making the 
threat ~o join the London Club in case of default a credible one;  (c) make certain that the 
individual syndicate members have no  incentive to  deviate ex post from the syndicate's 
decision so that the syndicate does not unravel. We now describe our modeling assumptions. 
We assume an infinite period setting. At the beginning of each period, a risk neutral 
borrowing country has an  investment opportunity available requiring the outlay I. If the 
investment is made, the project produces a random quantity X of a perishable good at the end 
of the period. The output X is a random variable with finite expected value and time-invariant 
distribution. At the end of each period the country decides to either consume X and pay zero 
(voluntary default) or pay the risk neutral lender (a single bank or a syndicate of banks) the 
minimum of P (no default) or X (involuntary default). That is, we assume that partial voluntary Sovereign Debt  page 6 
default is not possible.9 The quantity P, which includes principal and interest, is assumed to be 
given and constant over time. 10 The bOll owing country's discount rate is a constant given by 
Ob  while the lender's discount rate is the constant 0/.  In this setting we  interpret "growth 
capacity" of the borrowing country to be the present value of the period-by-period gains (X -P) 
from the investment opportunity. 
We assume that at the beginning of each period either nothing is invested or I  is 
invested in full;  that is, partial investment cannot be undertaken. In a period in which the 
borrower does not undertake any investment project, it has nothing to  consume. It is also 
presumed that the country cannot use the output from one period to pay for the investment, I, 
of the next period as the good perishes between the time it is produced and the time it can be 
used for investment in the next period. II Therefore, to finance I the country needs to borrow 
from foreign banks. Specifically, one could imagine that at the beginning of every period a 
country announces whether or not it wishes to borrow I.  Then this country asks a bank to 
organize a loan. If  a bank refuses, the country may ask another bank to arrange the loan. If  the 
bank accepts, it decides about the size of the syndicate (that is, if  this bank does not ask other 
banks to join the financing, the syndicate is of size one). Also, as in practice, we assume that 
syndicate members are protected by equal-sharing clauses so that the debtor cannot default 
against syndicate members selectively. Even if there were multiple syndicates, cross-default 
clauses rule out selective default against a particular syndicate or bank; see Gabriel (1986, 
p. 113) for the cross-default clause. 
We also assume that there is symmetric and perfect information. The assumption that 
the realization of X is common knowledge implies that a lender can distinguish perfectly 
9This assumption, consistent with  the literature, limits the  number of unlikely scenarios that have to be 
considered. We also assume that in a situation in which the borrower is indifferent between repaying and not 
repaying, it repays and repayment of earlier loans in later periods is ruled out. 
lOne amount P is determined by general competitive conditions. 
lIAs in Chowdhry (1991), the assumption that X is perishable may reflect a borrower's lack of financing 
capacity; or it may capture the notion that it is costly for a borrower to substitute the benefits of access to the 
international capital market via savings. Sovereign Debt  page 7 
between a voluntary default and an involuntary one, and reflects the idea that there is no inside 
information with respect to the general state of a country's economy. We make the standard 
assumption that, unless a borrower defaults voluntarily, ex ante, banks derive a positive net 
present value from lending. 12 
If  at the end of a period a country defaults (voluntarily or involuntarily) the syndicate 
has the choice whether or not to  use the London Club mechanism. As mentioned in the 
introduction, we assume that a highly visible body like the London Club cannot afford to be 
lenient to a voluntary defaulting borrower. We also assume that banks are similar to each other 
and syndicate cost structures are as specified below. 
a) Settling a (voluntary or involuntary) default without the help of an institution like the 
London Club costs the bank syndicate a total amount equal to g(N), with g(.) a strictly 
increasing function of N, the number of syndicate members, which captures the idea 
that the cost of coordinating the action of lenders increases with their number. This 
implies that if there is an involuntary default, the bank syndicate pockets X-g(N), and 
if there is a voluntary default the syndicate receives -g(N). 
b) Settling a (voluntary or involuntary) default with the help of the London Club costs 
f(N) withiO a strictly increasing function andf(l) = g(l). We also assume that due to 
12This could be consistent with the following situation. Consider a world with similar banks. Because of ever-
changing regulations and rules, a lender needs time to draw up a loan contract and also incurs direct out-of-pocket 
costs. Therefore, no bank will accept to go into a competitive situation where the borrower asks several lenders 
simultaneously to submit a contract and then picks the one with the lowest interest rate. This would lead to a 
loss for the competing banks: at the time the interest rate is announced, the investigation costs are sunk; hence, 
competition forces banks to accept rates that do not recover these costs. Consequently, banks only accept to 
participate if the following type of exclusivity contract is offered: between the moment that the bank starts its 
investigation and it makes its interest-rate offer, the borrower does not approach any other lender. Lenders could 
give the country an incentive to abide to this exclusivity clause by charging an up-front fee. Thus, each time a 
country refuses an offer, it will lose time and money. If the borrower is sufficiently impatient relative to the Sovereign Debt  page 8 
the coordination possibilities of the London Club,f(.) increases slower than g(.). This 
cost structure implies that as the number of lenders increases, it is increasingly efficient 
to  use the Club for settling defaults. Our assumption about the positive net present 
value implies that in case of no voluntary default, 0 < E [min(p  , X - f(l  ))] - I, where 
(1 +0/) 
the symbol E denotes the expectations operator. 
c) We presume all costs and revenues are split evenly over syndicate members. Hence, 
each period that lending occurs and there is  no  voluntary default, each syndicate 
member pockets the  fraction  liN of the net present value, which is E[min(P, X -
f(N))f(1 +0/)] - 1 if the London Club is  used to  settle an  involuntary default and 
E[min(P, X - g(N))f(l+o/)] -I  if the London Club is not used. 
2.  The  Efficiency  of Temporary  Punishment 
This section contains our results. We show that: (a) borrowers rationally prefer not to 
default (voluntarily) ex post; (b) lenders precommit to a contract promising to abstain from 
lending for a limited number of periods after voluntary default so that punishment is only for a 
finite period; (c)  to  precommit to  the preceding contract, lenders form sufficiently large 
syndicates so that ex post it is efficient to use an institution such as the London Club in the 
event of a default; (d) equal-sharing clauses eliminate any incentives for individual members of 
a syndicate to deviate ex post from the syndicate's policy. 
The above results are obtained via three propositions. In Proposition 1, we derive the 
optimal length of the punishment phase in a world with only one syndicate (and possibly many 
borrowers) presuming that this lender, if it wishes, can ex ante credibly precomrnit to abstain 
from lending during the punishment phase and assuming that syndicates do not unravel. Still 
assuming that syndicates do  not unravel, Proposition 2  shows that the  way  banks  can 
precornrnit to abstain from lending during the punishment phase is by forming a multi-bank 
syndicate that finds  it optimal, ex post, to  negotiate with the debtor country through an 
institution such as the London Club and exclude it from new loans during the punishment Sovereign Debt  page 9 
phase. Finally, Proposition 3 considers the situation with many lenders and shows that in the 
event of a voluntary default by a borrower against the current lender, other lenders will abstain 
from lending to this borrower during the punishment phase. This implies that no individual 
syndicate member has an incentive to form a new syndicate (possibly consisting only of itself) 
and relend next period. Thus, syndicate members have no incentive to deviate from syndicate 
policy. 
We start by examining the case of a single syndicate. 
PROPOSITION 1: Consider a syndicate of  N banks such that E[min(P, X-f(N))/(  1  +8/)J - I > 
O. Also consider the following contract: the syndicate promises to lend to a borrower until a 
voluntary default occurs; in the case of  a voluntary default, the lender abstains from relending 
for T(X) periods, with T(X) satisfying 
T(X) =  min {t I X  - max[O, (X - P)]  ~ E[max(O, X - P)]a(t, 8b)}  ,  (1) 
where, t is some positive integer and a(.,.) is the annuity factor, (1/8b) x (1  - 1/[ 1  +8b]t). 
Under the contract described above, a rational borrower does not default voluntarily; also, 
given the choice ex ante, the lender prefers to precommit to this contract (that is, not to lend for 
T(X) periods following a voluntary default). 
Proof: Part I-to show that under the proposed contract voluntary default is against the 
interests of the borrower. Consider the moment the borrower decides whether or not to repay 
the amount owed, P. The borrower, expecting the lender to abide by the contract, perceives the 
following present value of consumption in case it defaults voluntarily this period but abides by 
the contract afterwards: 
Value default =  X + 
1 
(1 +8b)T(X) 
E[max(O, X - P)] 
8b 
If  the borrower does not default voluntarily, its payoff is: 
Value abide = max(O, X _ P) +  E[max(O, X - P)] 
8b Sovereign Debt  page 10 
To get a rational borrower not to default, T(X) should be chosen so that Value default ~  Value 
abide: 
x +  1  E[max(O, X - P)]  ~ max(O, X _ P)  +  E[max(O, X - P)] 
(1 +Ob)T(X)  Ob  Ob 
or equivalently: 
X - max(O, X - P) ~  E[max(O, X - P)]a(T(X), 0b) . 
To interpret this condition, note that the left-hand-side of (1) is the single-period gain from 
defaulting while the right-hand-side is  the loss  suffered during the T(X) periods that the 
borrower is excluded from new loans. Thus, the condition in (1) ensures that defaulting 
voluntarily is not profitable for the borrower. Clearly, (1) also guarantees that defaulting more 
than once is also unprofitable to the borrower. 
Part 2-to show that, given the choice, a rational lender prefers to precommit to 
punishing a borrower for T(X) periods rather than forgiving and relending immediately 
following a voluntary default. Suppose that the lender did not precornmit to  abstain from 
lending immediately (in the next period) following a voluntary default; that is, T(X) =  O. Then, 
because condition (1) is violated, the lender would rationally expect the borrower to default 
again at the end of that period. Hence, if the lender compares the net present value of this 
outcome (always negative) to the one where it precornmits to not lend immediately following a 
default (zero), it prefers the latter choice. The same argument may be repeated for any t ~  T(X). 
However, as soon as t> T(X), the lender prefers to relend because for such t, condition (1) is 
met.  For t> T(X), the net present value from lending, E[min(P, X - f(N))/(l  +(1)] - I, is 
greater than the net present value from not lending, zero, and thus it is optimal not to punish for 
a period longer than T(X).  1111 
Part 1 of the proof places a lower bound on T(X), while the arguments in Part 2 impose 
an upper bound and imply that a contract promising permanent exclusion is not subgame 
perfect for the lender; that is, if the lender did not make new loans even after T(X) periods have 
elapsed, it would be cutting itself off from future profitable business. Sovereign Debt  page 11 
Equation (1) shows that the optimal punishment is independent of history (that is, past 
deviation). This, of course, follows from the stationar-:lty of the game. Furthennore, the present 
value of the stream E[max(O, X -P)] is the main factor influencing the length of punishment: 
the larger the present value of E[max(O, X - P)], the shorter the length of punishment. Hence 
countries with high growth potential need not be punished very long before the windfall gains 
from voluntary default are offset by the loss in growth. Conversely, if the present value of 
E[max(O, X - P)] is very low, it may not be possible to satisfy condition (1); in this case there 
may not exist a debt contract to which a rational borrower complies with ex post. In our model, 
such borrowers would be excluded from the market for sovereign loans.  13 
We have shown, in Proposition 1,  that given the choice, lenders find it optimal to 
precommit ex ante to abstain from lending in the event of a voluntary default. Lenders also 
recognize that ex post there may be an incentive to deviate from their commitment to punish 
borrowers who have defaulted voluntarily. In Proposition 2, we show that the way lenders 
overcome the precommitment problem is by forming a large enough syndicate at the time of 
initiation of the loan so that in the event of a voluntary default it is optimal to use the London 
Club to deal with the borrower in default. And, the institutional setup of the London Club is 
such that to maintain its reputation it does not resume lending immediately to a borrower who 
has defaulted voluntarily. 
Summarizing the argument in Proposition 2, note that following a default the choice 
that lenders are faced with is to: (a) use a more cost-efficient agency such as the London Club 
to handle negotiations, with the understanding that this precludes the possibility of resuming 
lending immediately; or (b) to negotiate with the borrower-in-default without a specialized 
agency-at a higher cost-but with the option to forgive the defaulting borrower. Lenders 
ensure that it will be preferable to use the London Club ex post (and not relend immediately) by 
13Such borrowers may be able to enter the credit market with the help of other agencies. For example, if the 
country receives financial help from donor countries, P and/or Db could be reduced, so that the present value of 
E[max(O, X-P)] increases. In fact one possible reason why interest rates charged by banks decrease after a 
borrower has defaulted could be the fact that in return for help the country has to accept supervision from the 
IMP (see Kremmydas (1989)) whereby usually the IMP steers the country into opting for less risky projects. Sovereign Debt  page 12 
ex ante fonning syndicates that are large enough so that the cost advantage of using the London 
Club outweighs the benefits from the immediate resumption of lending. 
PROPOSITION 2: Assume that syndicates do not unravel. Then, banks credibly precommit to 
the contract described in Proposition 1 by forming a syndicate large enoughfor the London 
Club to be cost efficient. In particular, lending occurs whenever there exists an N such that 
o  < {limin(p, X - feN) )] _  I} (1 +81) aCt, 8z)  < g(N)  - feN)  (2) 
~L  (1 +81) 
and if  such an N does not exist, then banks do not lend. 
Proof: The first inequality states that for lending to take place it must be a positive net present 
value operation for the syndicate as a whole. The second inequality in (2) implies that it is 
profitable to use the London Club in the event of a voluntary default. To see this, suppose that 
at the end of the period the borrower defaults voluntarily but promises not to default in the 
future if the current default is forgiven. Then, the syndicate has two choices: either to use the 
London Club and exclude the borrower for T(X) periods or to resume lending immediately. If 
the syndicate uses the London Club to negotiate with the borrower and excludes the borrower 
from future loans for T(X) periods, the cashflows to this syndicate are - feN) today and zero 
for the next T(X) periods. If, on the other hand, the syndicate decides not to use the London 
Club and it decides to forgive the default, then the cashflows this period are -g(N), and the 
present value from future loans over the next T(X) periods is: 
{Ffmin(p, X - feN) )] _  I} (1 +81)  aCt, 81). 
~L  (1 +81) 
Thus, it will be optimal ex post to abstain from lending for T periods only if: 
-g(N)  +  {Ffmin(p, X - feN) )] _  I} (1 +81) aCt, 81) < - feN). 
-L  (1+81) 
Rearranging this condition yields the second inequality in (2).  /11/ 
The second inequality in (2) can be interpreted as one that compares the present value of 
the gains to the syndicate over the next T(X) periods from not using the London Club to Sovereign Debt  page 13 
implement the promised punishment phase (= [E[min(P, X - f(N))/(l  +8[)] -l](l  +8[)a(T, 8[) 
with the direct saving from using the London Club (= g(N) - f(N)). Clearly if the latter is 
larger than the former, the syndicate has a credible precommitment to use the London Club. As 
without such precommitment there is no reason for the borrower ever to repay, and in view of 
the fact that g(N) andf(N) are increasing functions of  N, the optimal action for the lenders is to 
form the smallest syndicate for which (2) holds. 
Proposition 2 implies that if the left hand side of the second inequality in (2) is large 
(say, for example, because the loan is for a large amount), then the syndicate needs to be large 
so  that the cost savings from using the London Club device are sufficiently important. 
Conversely, when the net present value from making sovereign loans is smaller, a smaller 
syndicate is sufficient. Furthermore, if  the profitability is not large enough to sustain a positive 
net present value for a precommitted syndicate, no lending occurs. Proposition 2 also implies 
that when lending occurs, the London Club handles all debt renegotiation, and if the growth 
prospects of borrowers are estimated correctly, debt is forgiven only in the case of involuntary 
default. 
We now examine the situation where there are many potential lenders, and where the 
existing lender has precommitted to the contract described in Proposition 1. 
PROPOSITION  3: Given a  lender who  has precommitted to exclude for T(X) periods a 
borrower that defaults voluntarily, then  no  other lender has an incentive to  lend to  this 
borrower while it is being punished by thefirst lender. 
Proof: Suppose that a second syndicate would relend to a voluntary defaulting borrower 
during the last period of the punishment phase, T(X). Then the borrower may switch back to 
the first lender next period. Hence, the borrower has no incentive to repay the second syndicate 
at the end of period T(X). As the second syndicate anticipates this, it prefers not to grant credit 
during this period. Folding back to period T(X) - 1, as the borrower anticipates that in period 
T(X) the second syndicate will not grant it credit, the borrower has no incentive to repay the 
second syndicate at the end of period T(X) - 1, either. Hence, the second syndicate prefers to Sovereign Debt  page 14 
abstain from lending at time T(X) - 1.  The proposition is proved by folding back until the 
period immediately following a voluntary default.  IIII 
Proposition 3 implies that while a borrower is being punished by a particular lender for 
defaulting voluntarily, it is cut off from the rest of the credit market. It also implies that no 
individual syndicate member has an incentive to deviate from the syndicate's policy by forming 
a new syndicate (possibly consisting of only itself) and relending immediately. Hence, after a 
voluntary default a large enough syndicate (that is, one precommitted to the London Club) does 
not unravel. 
3.  Conclusions 
In this paper, we develop the notion that syndication and the London Club are devices 
that allow banks to precommit to a debt contract so that: (a) borrowers rationally prefer not to 
default (voluntarily) ex post;  (b) lenders precommit to a contract promising to abstain from 
lending for a limited number of periods after voluntary default by borrowers; (c) to make this 
precommitment credible lenders form syndicates; (d) in the event of an involuntary default, 
there is no punishment; and (e)  even after repeated voluntary default it is possible for a 
borrower to have access to  credit markets. Thus, our work provides a rationale for bank 
syndicates, which arise as part of a pre-commitment device rather than for the traditional reason 
of risk sharing, and for the emergence of a centralized forum for debt renegotiation, such as the 
London Club. Sovereign Debt  page 15 
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